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ABSTRACT 
 
Car owners are familiar with the warning lights on the 
dashboard and the beeping sound reminding them to use their 
seatbelt. But, neither the legislature nor courts have concretely 
defined the legal nature of these alerts.  This iBrief will analyze 
when a deficient alert becomes a defective product tort claim and 
determine the appropriate theory under which such claims should 
be brought. 
 INTRODUCTION  
¶1 In product manufacturing, a design that is not as safe as reasonably 
possible both subjects users to unnecessary risk and subjects sellers to tort 
liability.  Likewise, the users of products must be supplied with all 
reasonable warnings to protect them from unknown dangers and to protect 
manufacturers from prosecution. 
¶2 The line between design defect and failure to warn can be difficult 
to discern.  It can also be difficult to discern the difference between optional 
safety features and features necessary to make a product usable.  These 
distinctions can be explored by analyzing audio and visual alerts in 
automobiles.  With the widespread use of light up displays, beeping noises, 
and verbal audio cues, differentiating between just safe enough and unsafe 
can become complicated.  Such alarms could be characterized as warnings; 
thus, a deficiency could amount to a failure to warn of dangerous 
conditions.  Conversely, they could be seen as safety features of the car, like 
mirrors and seatbelts, subject to design defect claims.  After careful 
analysis, it becomes clear that the range of what warnings are safe enough is 
broad, but the best reading of case law restricts such deficiencies to design 
defect litigation. 
                                                     
1 J.D. candidate at Duke University School of Law, 2010; B.A., Wake Forest 
University, 2003. The author would like to thank Professor Francis McGovern 
for his guidance and his wife Allison Overstreet McKell for her constant 
support. 
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¶3 The only types of defect being considered here are design defect 
and failure to warn.  Manufacturing defects, as unintentional acts with strict 
liability imposed upon them, can happen to any object regardless of 
technology and regardless of what component is defective.  For the 
purposes of this analysis, it will be useful to assume all products are 
accurately manufactured.  The only aspects of interest here are those 
intentionally included by manufacturers which are alleged to be defective. 
I. TECHNOLOGY, LEGAL DUTIES, AND OBSOLETE PRODUCTS 
¶4 In the course of human progression, new technologies are 
constantly surpassed by newer technologies.  The law recognizes this 
progression, and where the use of technology is related to legal duties, the 
use of modern technology is subsumed into that legal duty.  If one has a 
duty to give information to Mr. Smith in California in a timely manner, it 
would not be sufficient in 2008 to send the letter by ox-drawn wagon.  It is 
assumed that you will and must use some form of electronic communication 
or else some postal service which can deliver it in a week, rather than in 
months.  Police are expected to utilize forensic evidence in ways 
unavailable 200 years ago.  Doctors will be liable for malpractice if, instead 
of running necessary tests and proscribing medicine, they treat every illness 
with bloodletting. 
¶5 In this same way, safety features and warnings on products must 
utilize available technology.  Warnings concerning medical procedures can 
take up many pages; warnings of this length would have been impractical 
and ineffective before the printing press and inexpensive paper production, 
when they would have been transmitted orally.  Originally, car windshields 
were made of normal glass;2 now, a car that does not take advantage of 
safer glass designs runs a high risk of being found unreasonably dangerous.3
¶6 In this way, safe products, safe designs, and safe warnings can all 
become unsafe when a safer alternative becomes available.  In the case of 
The T. J. Hooper,
   
4 Learned Hand explained how the absence of radio 
receivers on tugboats made those tugboats defective.  At that time, it was 
not yet common practice for tugboats to carry these radios.5  Despite that 
fact, such radios were not expensive, cumbersome, or difficult to use.6
                                                     
2 See National Glass Association, Your Windshield is Not Just a "Wind-Shield" 
Any More, 
  
http://www.speedyglass.com/auto-glass-news/2009/03/your-
windshield-is-not-just-wind-shield.html, http://www.speedyglass.com/auto-
glass-news/2009/04/your-windshield-is-not-just-wind-shield.html (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2010).     
3 See id. 
4 The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1932). 
5 Id.  
6 Id. 
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Analyzing the role of common practice or custom in determining reasonable 
safety provisions, the court said that 
in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but 
strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged 
in the adoption of new and available devices. . . . Courts must in the 
end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even 
their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.7
The mere availability of this technology made its absence tortuous.  
   
¶7 There are two considerations in determining when new technology 
must be utilized to make a product reasonably safe.  The first is local 
statute.  Different states have different requirements for when new scientific 
knowledge must be incorporated into new products. For example, the 
California and Alaska Supreme Courts have held that products must 
conform to “reasonably scientifically knowable” information.8  By contrast, 
the Colorado Supreme Court takes a stance more akin to strict liability.9  
Arizona has adopted a “knew or should have known” standard for some of 
its product defect cases.10
¶8 The second deciding factor of when new technology must be 
utilized is the reasoning of the finder of fact.  Reasonableness, whether in 
design or in warning, is a question of fact.
  Variation in state standards makes it impossible 
to generalize when a product becomes obsolete. 
11  While judges occasionally rule 
on the reasonableness of designs,12 ideally such findings are left for the 
jury; judges should only step in when the evidence is so lopsided that only a 
mistake could account for the jury finding contrary to the evidence.13
II. CAR ALERTS AS DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS 
  
Because of the jury’s role as a fact finder, there should never be a bright line 
rule concerning when a product becomes obsolete and defective.  Each case 
needs individualized analysis. 
¶9 Car alerts, like every other aspect of an automobile, can be 
defective.  They can suffer from poor design, construction, or instructions 
                                                     
7 Id. (citations omitted). 
8 Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 
835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992). 
9 See Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 665 P.2d 118 (Colo. 
1983). 
10 Powers v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 174 P.3d 777 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
11 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998); see also 
Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 215 (3rd Cir. 1991). 
12 See, e.g., Smith v. Louisville Ladder Corp., 237 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 2001); see 
also GMC v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1999). 
13  Jackson v. OMI Corp., 245 F.3d 525, 528 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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for use.  However, it is difficult to say how such devices should be judged 
for adequacy, since some alerts might be more effective than others. 
¶10 There are many different technologies available for car alerts.  
Many cars include visual cues on the dashboards, such as gauges and 
lighted symbols, alerting a driver of the available gas, the temperature of the 
car, etc.14  Sometimes, these visual cues take the form of written words, 
when the dashboard is equipped with a display; such displays can alert a 
driver in printed text that the oil needs replacing or that the weather is cold 
enough for ice hazards to be possible.15  There are also auditory cues given 
by cars.  Some cars make beeping or buzzing noises when activated, 
indicating the keys are still in the ignition, the car is low on fuel, or the 
seatbelts are not being used.  While few cars use verbal cues (recorded 
audio voice messages) for such safety concerns, the technology is neither 
novel nor expensive16 and is used extensively in automobile GPS systems.17
¶11 With so many alerts available, the manufacturer must decide which 
warning system is best.  Beyond the desire to make car alerts more effective 
so as to prevent dangerous incidents, this question is legally important for 
car manufacturers.  If it can be shown that a different option (say, verbal 
alerts) would have made the car safer or warned of a danger better than the 
existing alert (say, a lit symbol on the dash), then the manufacturer risks a 
finding of defectiveness on the entire line of vehicles.   
 
¶12 Different people might find different warning styles to be more 
effective.  Some people respond better to visual stimuli while others 
respond best to audio stimuli.18  This would seem to relax the requirement 
that a warning be as effective as possible, since there is no uniformly “most 
effective” method of warnings.  However, a reasonable alternate design or 
warning does not need to be proven safer every time for every person to be 
a legal requirement.19
                                                     
14 See GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, 2005 CHEVROLET COBALT OWNERS 
MANUAL 3-21 (2004). 
  It is enough that in the totality of the evidence, the 
proposed alternative would make the product safer overall.  If one alert is 
15 See id. at 3-35. 
16 See, e.g., Independent Living Aids, Inc.: Digital Talking Watch with Voice 
and Alarm, www.independentliving.com/prodinfo.asp?number=756241 (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2010) (selling a talking alarm watch for the sight impaired for 
$5.00). 
17 See, e.g., Consumer Reports: GPS Features, 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/cars/tires-auto-parts/gps/gps-buying-
advice/gps-features/gps-features.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2010) (detailing the 
feature of giving spoken street names when giving directions). 
18 See generally Felicia Lincoln, Learning Styles of ESL Students in Community 
Colleges, 30 COMMUNITY C. J. RES. & PRAC 484 (2006). 
19 Smith v. Louisville Ladder Corp., 237 F.3d 515, 531–32 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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shown to be less effective generally than another, it runs a risk of being 
found defective.  
¶13 There are some generalizations that can be used to determine which 
warnings are more effective.  Usually, the more specific a warning is, the 
easier it is to understand and weigh accurately.  A light on the dash that says 
“CHECK ENGINE” would generally be less effective in getting a person to 
stop a car than a warning that says “ENGINE IS ABOUT TO EXPLODE-TURN 
ENGINE OFF NOW.”  Research shows the best way to get a person’s attention, 
especially if he is busy with other sensory input, is to give him both a visual 
cue and an auditory cue.20
¶14 However, the mark of a reasonable alternative is more than merely 
whether it is safer.  For design defect cases, the proposed alternative must 
also take into account cost, desires in the marketplace, aesthetics, etc.
  From this it would seem to follow that any 
important alert that is merely a light or merely a beep is deficient, and can 
be made more effective by combining audio and visual cues and by making 
the meaning of the alert clearer. 
21  
Failure to warn cases must take into account the decreased value of each 
warning as more warnings are added, detracting from their perceived 
importance.22
¶15 Questions regarding the sufficiency of alerts are questions for the 
jury.  These questions are questions of degree, are very fact specific, and 
cannot be generalized by a bright line rule.  Hypothetical cases can be made 
which would require a ruling as a matter of law for the plaintiff and others 
for the defendant.
  If every alert had a loud audio component and bright flashing 
lights, alerts would become an irritant that few drivers would want.  If every 
piece of information about a car’s present condition (speed, temperature, 
seatbelt use, doors being opened) was scrolling across the dash and spoken 
through the speakers, it is possible that they would be turned off or tuned 
out. 
23
                                                     
20 Valerio Santangelo & Charles Spence, Multisensory Cues Capture Spatial 
Attention Regardless of Perceptual Load, 
  The existence of such hypotheticals shows that while 
not every case must reach a jury, there is a lot of middle room where there 
33 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 1311, 1320 
(2007).  
21 See Lindsey v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 150 F.3d 1307, 1314 (11th Cir. 
1998). 
22 See Broussard v. Cont’l Oil Co., 433 So. 2d 354, 358 (La. Ct. App. 1983). 
23 A hypothetical case where an existing alert is proven to be zero percent 
effective in conveying an important safety alert and an alternative with one 
hundred percent effectiveness exists with no change in cost or aesthetics would 
be defective as a matter of law.  A hypothetical where a visual alert of a five-
pointed star is challenged without research, saying a six-pointed star would give 
the specific user a better warning, would not be defective as a matter of law. 
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is a reasonable debate about an alert’s effectiveness.  Like in traditional 
design defect and failure to warn cases, it rests largely on the trier of fact to 
say what is reasonable and what is not.  This is the proper standard for 
automobile alert cases. 
III. A FAILURE TO WARN OR A DESIGN DEFECT? 
¶16 It is an important distinction to make whether insufficient warnings 
of this type constitute a design defect or a failure to warn.  Plaintiffs are 
permitted to bring a claim under manufacturing and design defects 
simultaneously, when the evidence permits.24  In this way, it becomes less 
important for a plaintiff to distinguish between the claims, allowing a jury 
to decide which case is stronger.  However, many courts do not allow a 
plaintiff to submit both a design defect theory and a failure to warn theory 
to the jury using identical evidentiary support, forcing most plaintiffs to 
choose one theory at the outset of litigation.25  No federal preemption issue 
concerning car alarms currently exists, but even without the preemption 
concern present with pharmaceuticals26 and pesticides,27 it is crucial that 
plaintiffs correctly identify the theory under which to bring their claim since 
they will only get one bite at the apple.  Additionally, though the 
requirements of design defects and failure to warn claims are essentially 
identical in section 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 
they are treated differently in the comments28 and by courts.  Courts often 
rule as a matter of law in design defect cases, especially if not brought 
under a consumer expectations test.29
A. Insufficient audio and visual alerts as a failure to warn 
 
¶17 At first glance, an insufficient warning system in a car seems to 
constitute a failure to warn.  A loud beeping noise when a car is accidentally 
left in drive, similar to a warning in the owner’s manual to “Always double 
check that the car is not accidentally left in drive” might induce someone to 
double check which gear they are in when parking.  Neither audio warnings 
                                                     
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3 cmt. b (1998).  
25  To be clear, a plaintiff can bring both claims if they rest on different facts, 
such as if a product was defectively manufactured at time X and the proffered 
warnings given at time Y were insufficient,  but the same fact cannot lead to a 
design defect and a failure to warn.  See, e.g., Brown v. Raymond Corp., 432 
F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2005).  
26 See, e.g., Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1631 (2009).  
27 See, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431 (2005). 
28 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. i (1998). 
29 JAMES HENDERSON & AARON TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS 
AND PROCESS 373 (6th ed. 2008). 
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nor flashing lights affect the functioning of a car; in that way, neither can be 
classified as functional safety features, as a guard rail or a dead-man’s 
switch would be.  Instead they are simply warnings that are conveyed as 
audio or visual messages in the cab of a car instead of in writing. 
¶18 Potential solutions to the problem of cars slipping into reverse 
illuminate the difference between alerts and design changes.  Such 
situations have caused numerous deaths and have been the subject of 
numerous lawsuits.30  By not including such an alert, or by providing an 
insufficient alert for the risk and situation,31 a manufacturer may be liable 
for failing to warn.  Compare this to a design change, altering how the gear 
shift works, keeping the car from ever accidentally shifting into reverse.32
¶19 Consider the case of Prince Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp.
  
Changing the gear shifting mechanism is a functional change and 
undoubtedly a design issue.    A design change alters the way the car works 
while an alert does not.  A design change makes a product safer in itself 
while an alert does not.  An alert brings the consumer’s attention to a risk 
while a change in design would be inconspicuous.   
33  In 
this case, an airplane gauge incorrectly reported how much usable fuel was 
contained in the plane’s fuel tanks.  As a consequence, the plane ran out of 
fuel and crashed, killing and injuring its passengers.  The Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit determined that the fuel gauge, which overestimated 
the available fuel, along with the instruction manual, which indicated a 
larger tank of available fuel, constituted a failure to warn claim and not a 
design defect claim.  While the court limited its analysis since it determined 
the statute of limitations had run, the court explained that the faulty gauges, 
the faulty instructions, and the failure to warn of these defects were all a 
“failure to warn” claim, even though one aspect (the gauge) is part of the 
craft, one aspect (the manual) is a printed warning, and one aspect is a 
verbal warning.34
                                                     
30 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. 1999); 
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin, 222 S.W.2d 995 (Tex. 1949). 
 
31 A light on the dashboard would be insufficient, since in such a situation the 
driver will certainly be exiting the car, probably in a hurry, and is unlikely to 
notice a light on the dashboard.  A noise alert would be superior.  Presumably 
for the same reason, many cars use a noise instead of a light for informing the 
driver that they are leaving their keys in the ignition or that they are leaving their 
headlights on. 
32 See Gen. Motors Corp., 997 S.W.2d. at 589–90. 
33 952 F.2d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 1991). 
34 Id. at 1221–22.   
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B. Insufficient audio and visual alerts as a design defect 
¶20 There is, however, a second side to such alerts.  These alerts do give 
warnings, but these warnings are not the same as standard, static warnings.  
Typical verbal or written warnings which reference general concerns that 
must be kept in mind throughout a products use are static, and the warning 
does not give any alert as to present conditions.  Instead, car alerts are 
conditioned on a car sensor detecting a dangerous condition and 
subsequently alerting the driver.   
¶21 Such a device, which takes readings and gives important safety 
information, acts similarly to a pressure or temperature gauge in an 
industrial machine.  Such a gauge is a safety feature which does not change 
the operation of the machine.  However, if such a gauge malfunctions, then 
it would likely fall under a design or manufacturing defect.  Provided that 
adequate warning and instruction were given on the use of the gauge, the 
gauge is a unit which can work or fail to work, like any other manufactured 
unit.   
¶22 In Chohlis v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,35
¶23 Similarly, in McLennan v. American Eurocopter Corp.,
 a plane crash was caused by the 
plane running out of fuel.  The plane had four different fuel tanks and a 
switch would alternate between which tank was being used at a given time.  
A fuel gauge would indicate the current fuel level in the tank being used.  
However, the auxiliary tanks burn fuel at an increased rate.  The plaintiff 
claimed that the plane’s instrument panel was designed defectively for a 
variety of reasons, including the lack of an indicator light to show a tank as 
near exhausted.  While the jury ultimately determined that the cause was 
pilot error, the case was allowed to go to the jury under a design defect 
claim.  The plaintiff alleged both negligence and strict liability for the 
design defect, and also that insufficient warnings were given as to proper 
use of the plane.  On appeal, the appellate court affirmed, finding that the 
lower court had properly handed the situation off to the jury under a design 
defect theory and did not mention a possible failure to warn theory. 
36 injury 
was caused by a helicopter running out of fuel because of an inaccurate fuel 
gauge.  In this case, the plaintiff seems to have become confused as to 
whether he wanted to bring the claim as an “unreasonably dangerous” 
design defect claim or a failure to warn.37  While the court said that he 
would lose under either theory, it suggested that the case would have been 
best brought as a defective design case.38
                                                     
35 760 F.2d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 1985). 
 
36 245 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2001). 
37 Id. at 427. 
38 Id. 
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¶24 It is true that in Prince Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp.39  the 
court said the claim should be viewed as a failure to warn claim and not a 
defect claim.  However, that was not because the gauge failed to warn of the 
low fuel.  Rather, the court reasoned that the gauge was “defective and 
misrepresented and overstated the amount of usable fuel to the pilot,” and 
that the purchasers were not sufficiently warned of this problem.40
¶25 Looking back to The T.J. Hooper,
 
41 one can find further support 
that insufficient warning devices should be litigated as failed devices rather 
than failed warnings.  The only defect of the Hooper was its lack of a 
receiving radio.  Learned Hand never refers to this deficiency as a design 
defect or a failure to warn, merely saying it made the tugboat defective and 
unseaworthy.42  However, a finding that a vessel is unseaworthy is 
tantamount to a finding of design defect.  Seaworthiness requires a vessel, 
“including her equipment and crew,”43 be “reasonably fit for the purpose for 
which [it] is used.”44  Examples of conditions that can render a vessel 
unseaworthy include defective gear, appurtenances in disrepair, insufficient 
manpower, unfit crew, and improper methods of loading or stowing cargo.45  
A crewmember tripping when stepping through a hatch does not give rise to 
a claim that a vessel is unseaworthy.46  Neither is a ship unseaworthy 
because hatches are left open, allowing water to interfere with the 
emergency electrical unit.47  In either of these situations, additional 
warnings of the inherent dangers of the boat designs might have prevented 
the injuries.  However, neither the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit nor the respective plaintiffs brought up failure to warn as a 
possible cause of a vessel being unseaworthy.48
                                                     
39 Prince Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 952 F.2d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 
1991). 
  Presumably, if such a claim 
was available, the plaintiffs would have utilized it, or the court would have 
40 Id.  
41 The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932). 
42 See id. at 740. 
43 Jackson v. OMI Corp., 245 F.3d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Gutierrez v. 
Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206, 215 (1963)). 
44 In re Matter of Hechinger, 890 F.2d 202, 207 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation 
omitted). 
45 Usner v. Luckenbach Overseas Corp., 400 U.S. 494, 499 (1971). 
46 See OMI, 245 F.3d 525, 528 (holding that the district courts finding of 
unseaworthiness for a lack of a handrail was clearly erroneous and that the 
passageway was reasonably safe for anyone using ordinary common sense). 
47 See Folger Coffee Co. v. Olivebank, 201 F.3d 632, 637–38 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that hatches which may be opened or closed being habitually left open 
to the damage of instruments did not render the ship unseaworthy).   
48 See OMI, 245 F.3d 525; Folger Coffee, 201 F.3d 632. 
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likely mentioned it.49
¶26 The Supreme Court has said that the duty of a boat provider to warn 
is a “narrow one,” consisting of only those things that the provider knows or 
should know of, which are “neither obvious to nor anticipated by a skilled 
[sailor].”
  It stands to reason that a failure to warn theory was 
not available to them for proving a claim of an unseaworthy vessel.   
50
C. The continued importance of the design/warning distinction 
  In Hooper, the weather on a given day was not known to the 
boat owner in advance, nor was the risk of bad weather unknown to 
experienced sailors.  The sailors were fully aware of the risks and knew how 
a radio would have lessened their risks.  Clearly, this is not the type of 
warning which the court wants boat owners to be required to make.  It 
stands to reason, therefore, that Learned Hand meant that an ineffective 
alert system is a defect in the product itself, making the product unsafe for 
use.  Such a deficiency is a design defect. 
¶27 The answer to this problem cannot be found in legislative history.  
No law states whether triggered alerts constitute warnings which can be 
insufficient, or safety devices which can be designed defectively.  Nor is 
there a clear, judicially proscribed solution.  The cases occasionally suggest 
that one theory is better for the situation, but never go into an analysis on 
why one is improper.   
¶28 At first blush, the characterization of design defect versus failure to 
warn is nothing but a strategic choice, with no legally wrong answer.51
It is sometimes said that inadequate or no warnings at all constitute—
and are merely one form of—a design “defect;” and, that because 
knowledge of the dangerous character of a product is imputed in a 
strict liability design defect case it should also be imputed when the 
plaintiff alleges that the product is defective unless there is an 
accompanying warning of its dangerous character. Unfortunately, such 
an analysis is both overly simplistic and not warranted as a matter of 
policy. The initial purpose for allowing recovery under a failure to 
warn theory was that certain products are inherently dangerous for 
their intended or foreseeable uses, but these products should not be 
  
However, these two theories are distinct and must remain so.   
                                                     
49 E.g., Piercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir. 2007); Capitol Park 
Ltd. Dividend Hous. Ass’n v. Jackson, 202 F.App’x 873, 877 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 577 (6th 
Cir. 2002).  In these cases, the Court addressed causes of action which might 
have been raised by the parties.  
50 Howlett v. Birkdale Shipping Co., 512 U.S. 92, 105 (1994). 
51 See generally Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116 (Cal. 2001) (dealing with 
warnings and defects without emphasizing a distinction between them). 
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considered unreasonably dangerous as designed because they are 
beneficial to society and designed as flawlessly and economically 
feasible as possible.52
¶29 The language used by both the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability and the courts creates separate causes of action for design 
defects and failures to warn, but uses similar language to describe the 
causes of action.
 
53
¶30 Judges should not allow cases of insufficient alerts and gauges to 
reach the jury under the plaintiff’s choice of theory.  As a matter of law, 
deficient alerts are either insufficient warnings or a defective safety feature, 
not both.  While the law will allow a claimant to smudge the lines between 
defects when the nature of the defect is unknowable,
  The wording of the two causes of action is similar, but 
this similarity suggests the importance of the distinction.  The similarities 
show the ease by which the two theories could be combined if such a result 
was intended or desirable.  This has not been done, and the distinction has 
been maintained.   
54 this is the exception 
allowed to prevent injustice.  The separation of defect claims into 
manufacturing, design, and warning allow for clearer jury instructions and 
the development of appropriate rules concerning each.55
D. Triggered alerts are safety features and their insufficiencies 
constitute design defects  
   
¶31 There is a fine line between making a product safe to use by proper 
design and making a product’s use safe by warning of the relevant dangers.  
A car’s side mirror is a safety-oriented design feature, while the print 
“objects in mirror are closer than they appear” is a warning to make the 
mirror and the car’s use safer.  If the print were missing, the mirror would 
not become defectively designed for making objects seem far away; the 
mirror’s very purpose is to show a wider angle of view.  Likewise, mirrors 
which do not point in a useful direction make a car unsafe to operate, no 
matter how many warnings are given. 
¶32 Similarly, engine temperature gauges are safety features which 
measure an objective fact which is salient to the driver.  Improper 
instructions as to how to use or read the temperature gauge would not 
                                                     
52 Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 393–94 (Mo. 
1986). 
53 See, e.g., Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 288 F.App’x 597, 605–06 
(11th Cir. 2008); Moyer v. United Dominion Indus., 473 F.3d 532 (3d Cir. 
2007) (analyzing a claim of design defect and a claim of failure to warn as two 
separate claims).  Cf. Merrill, 28 P.3d 116. 
54 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3 cmt. b (1998). 
55 See generally Merrill, 28 P.3d 116. 
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render a gauge defective, but would instead constitute a failure to warn.  
Compare this to McLennan.56  In that case, the failure to warn argument was 
not that the faulty gauge failed to warn him about the low fuel level.  
Rather, his failure to warn claim rested on the manufacturer failing to warn 
of the inherent unreliability of the fuel gauge.57
¶33 If an alert in a car fails to detect the existence of an alert-worthy 
event (the fuel is low, the car is still in drive, the engine is overheating, etc.) 
then it is clearly a design defect.  An item in the car’s makeup was designed 
to judge the fuel/gear/temp and failed to do so.  Assuming there is a more 
reliable and reasonable alternative design for the sensor, the manufacturer 
should be liable under the design defect rule.  If the sensor acts properly but 
the alert itself fails to go off, then the light/sound producing part of the car 
is defective.  While it is a “warning device,” it is still making the car safer 
by informing the driver of the current state of the car.  This diagnostic 
device can fail, but doing so is a product not working as intended; the 
device failing is not caused by a lack of instruction by the manufacturer.  By 
contrast, if the alert goes off as intended, but the manufacturer failed to 
instruct the user of the meaning of the alert, then there is a failure to warn.  
Information such as “if the engine gauge says the car is too hot, then turn 
the engine off” doesn’t make the car work more safely, but is crucial for the 
safe operation of the car.   
   
¶34 Such an instruction, warning the customer that an alert of a hot 
engine means they should shut the engine off, is the exact type of warning 
contemplated by statute and jurisprudence.  Such a warning belongs in an 
instruction manual, or should be told to the customer at the time of sale.  
Such an instruction is a warning that must only be learned once, and 
instructs on how to use the vehicle safely.  By contrast, the alert that the car 
is too hot at a specific time could not be told ahead of time or sufficiently 
explained in an owner’s manual.  The driver has no way of sensing the 
temperature of the engine absent a sensor.  This sensor is a product which 
the owner will rely on to inform his of the state of the car, which will then 
allow him to use the warnings and instructions on how to use the car 
appropriately. 
¶35 Assume a sensor accurately assesses an emergency situation and 
properly gives off its visual or audio alert.  Assume also that the driver was 
adequately instructed on the car’s safety and alert systems and the 
seriousness with which one should take emergency alerts.  However, the 
alert fails to get the driver’s attention or fails to motivate him to the proper 
                                                     
56 McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2001).  
57 See id. at 432–34. In this case, the unreliability of the fuel gauge was not the 
relevant issue.  The failure to warn claim consisted solely of the manufacturer’s 
explanation of how to use and interpret the alert equipment.  Id. 
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action (perhaps the indicator is a light with an intentionally dim bulb).  This 
bulb and alert are not instructions, though it requires the warnings and 
instructions to properly interpret the alert and to know what to do.  This 
light is a safety feature of the car intended for the purpose of alerting the 
driver.  If this bulb, as designed, does not serve its intended purpose, it is 
designed defectively.  Drivers cannot determine the current state of the car 
and therefore the car is unsafe.  A dim bulb that does not motivate the driver 
to action is effectively the same as a sensor that does not work.  While 
courts have held that a manufacturer is protected by a “rebuttable 
presumption that an adequate warning ‘would have been read and 
heeded,’”58
CONCLUSION 
 it is unreasonable to say that any warning light (including those 
with minimal illumination) will be noticed.  The desired result of the safety 
system, namely to make known the state of the vehicle, has failed.   
¶36 Product defect cases involving car alerts should generally be passed 
along to the finder of fact as with all other design defect cases.  While some 
cases will certainly involve findings of law concerning reasonableness, the 
vast majority of cases should be judged by a reasonable jury.  Such a claim 
should be restricted to a design defect theory of liability, as a failure to warn 
theory would ignore the purpose and capabilities of such alerts and 
contravene the intent of standing defect law. 
 
                                                     
58  Eck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing 
Woulfe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 965 F. Supp. 1478 (E.D. Okla. 1997)). 
